Mercer Law Review
Volume 58
Number 2 Articles Edition

Article 10

3-2007

Hey Officer, Didn't Someone Teach You To Knock? The Supreme
Court Says No Exclusion of Evidence for Knock-and- Announce
Violations in Hudson v. Michigan
David Carn

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.mercer.edu/jour_mlr
Part of the Criminal Procedure Commons

Recommended Citation
Carn, David (2007) "Hey Officer, Didn't Someone Teach You To Knock? The Supreme Court Says No
Exclusion of Evidence for Knock-and- Announce Violations in Hudson v. Michigan," Mercer Law Review:
Vol. 58 : No. 2 , Article 10.
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.mercer.edu/jour_mlr/vol58/iss2/10

This Casenote is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Mercer Law School Digital Commons.
It has been accepted for inclusion in Mercer Law Review by an authorized editor of Mercer Law School Digital
Commons. For more information, please contact repository@law.mercer.edu.

Casenote

Hey Officer, Didn't Someone Teach You To
Knock? The Supreme Court Says No
Exclusion of Evidence for Knock-andAnnounce Violations in Hudson v. Michigan

In Hudson v. Michigan,1 the United States Supreme Court held in a
5-4 decision that evidence discovered by police after a knock-andannounce violation will not necessarily be excluded in court.2 The
majority opinion, written by Justice Scalia, stated that exclusion is only
appropriate where the interests protected by the knock-and-announce
requirement are implicated and that hiding evidence from the government is not one of those interests.3 The Court further held that the
substantial social costs of excluding evidence discovered upon knock-andannounce violations outweigh the deterrent effects of the exclusionary
rule against police misconduct and, therefore, the application of the
exclusionary rule against knock-and-announce violations is unjustified.4

1. 126 S. Ct. 2159 (2006).
2. Id. at 2165, 2168.
3. Id. at 2165.
4. Id. at 2168.
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The dissent, written by Justice Breyer, claimed that the majority
relied on misunderstandings of law5 and strongly asserted that
exclusion of evidence is, and has always been, the only effective
deterrent against knock-and-announce violations.6 Justice Kennedy
concurred in part and in the judgment, but expressed reservations that
a demonstration of a widespread pattern of knock-and-announce
violations would be cause for grave concern.8
The decision has important implications for both the government and
citizens. On the one hand, less incriminating evidence will be excluded
at trial. But on the other hand, there is a possibility that Fourth
Amendment rights will be completely disregarded at the doors of both
criminals and those innocently implicated in a necessarily imperfect law
enforcement system.
I.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Police obtained a warrant to search the home of Booker Hudson for
drugs and firearms, and in executing the warrant, they waited three to
five seconds after announcing their presence to enter the residence
through the unlocked front door.9 Inside the home, they found large
quantities of drugs and a loaded gun between the cushion and armrest
of the chair in which Hudson was sitting. i Hudson alleged that three
to five seconds was not a reasonable wait time under the Fourth
Amendment knock-and-announce requirement" and moved to suppress
the incriminating evidence.' 2 The trial court granted his motion, but
the Michigan Court of Appeals reversed, citing a number of Michigan
Supreme Court cases that held "suppression is inappropriate when entry
is made pursuant to [a] warrant but without proper 'knock and
announce.'"' 13 The Michigan Supreme Court denied Hudson's leave to
appeal, and he was convicted of drug possession. The court of appeals
rejected Hudson's renewed Fourth Amendment claim, and the Michigan
Supreme Court again declined review. 4 The United States Supreme

5. Id. at 2177-81 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
6. See id. at 2171.
7. Id. at 2170 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
8. Id. at 2171.
9. Hudson v. Michigan, 126 S. Ct. 2159, 2162 (2006).
10. Id.
11. Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927, 930 (1995).
12. Hudson, 126 S. Ct. at 2162.
13. Id. (citing People v. Vasquez, 602 N.W.2d 376 (Mich. 1999) (per curiam); People v.
Stevens, 597 N.W.2d 53 (Mich. 1999)).
14. Id.
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Court granted certiorari 5 and held that the exclusionary rule does not
necessarily apply to evidence seized upon a violation of the knock-andannounce rule.'6

II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A.

The Knock-and-Announce Requirement

The knock-and-announce principle was adopted from English commonlaw,17 embraced by early American courts and state constitutions,18
and codified by federal statute in 1917.'9 In 1995 the Court in Wilson
v. Arkansas ° held that the requirement of officers to knock and
announce their presence in execution of a warrant is an element of the
reasonableness inquiry under the Fourth Amendment.2 1 The knockand-announce requirement is currently codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3109.22
Under the knock-and-announce requirement, when executing a
warrant, officers must knock, announce their presence, and wait a
reasonable amount of time before forcing entry.23 The requirement
protects three main privacy interests: (1) permitting persons the
opportunity to comply and peaceably admit officers into their homes,
thus reducing the risk of violence; 24 (2) preventing unnecessary
destruction of property; and (3) allowing occupants the opportunity to
"prepare themselves," by, for example, "pull[ing] on clothes or get[ting]
out of bed." 25 These interests underlie the greater policy set forth in

15. Id.
16. Id. at 2165, 2168.
17. Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927, 931-33 (1995). The Court in Wilson noted that
the "knock and announce' principle appears to predate even Semayne's Case, (1603) 77
Eng. Rep. 194 (K.B.), which is usually cited as the judicial source of the common-law
standard. Seymane's Case itself indicates that the doctrine may be traced to a statute
enacted in 1275.. . ." Wilson, 514 U.S. at 932 n.2 (citing 77 Eng. Rep. at 196).
18. Id. at 933.
19. Act of June 15, 1917, ch. 30, Title XI, §§ 8-9, 40 Stat. 229.
20. 514 U.S. 927 (1995).
21. Id. at 930.
22. 18 U.S.C. § 3109 (2000).
23. See United States v. Banks, 540 U.S. 31, 35-36 (2003). In determining the
reasonableness of an entry, the Court considered the totality of the circumstances. Id.
24. Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385, 393 n.5 (1997).
25. Id. The Supreme Court in Richards recognized three exceptions to the knock-andannounce requirement. Id. In order for police to be justified in a "no-knock" entry, there
must be a "reasonable suspicion that knocking and announcing their presence, under
particular circumstances, would be [1] dangerous or [2] futile, or [3] that it would inhibit
the effective investigation of the crime by, for example, allowing the destruction of
evidence." Id. at 394.
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the Fourth Amendment for citizens to be secure in their homes against
unreasonable searches and seizures.2 6
B.

The Exclusionary Rule
The federal exclusionary rule was announced in the 1914 case Weeks
v. United States,27 where evidence seized in a warrantless search of the
defendant's home was excluded at trial.2" In formulating the rule, the
Court relied heavily on language from its 1886 decision in Boyd v.
United States.29 The Court in Boyd considered the harm from Fourth
Amendment violations to be not so much the actual "breaking of his
doors" or the "rummaging of his drawers," but more importantly, the
infringement upon the citizen's personal liberties and securities. °
Weeks added that not only should these essential liberties be protected,
but the tendency of government officials to infringe upon them should be
deterred."' Thus, the policies behind the formation of the exclusionary
rule included protecting citizens' personal rights and deterring police
misconduct.
C. Initial Broad Application of the Exclusionary Rule
Shortly after Weeks, the Supreme Court began expanding the
application of the federal exclusionary rule. In SilverthorneLumber Co.
v. United States,32 state officials illegally seized evidence from an office
and used it to form a cause of action against the defendants. The
Government acknowledged the illegal seizure, but nonetheless insisted
upon using the evidence obtained." The Court held that the illegally
seized evidence could not be used, stating that the purpose of the

26. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
27. 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
28. Id. at 398.
29. 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
30. Id. at 630. The Court stated:
The principles laid down in this opinion affect the very essence of constitutional
liberty ...[and] they apply to all invasions on the part of the government ....
It is not the breaking of his doors, and the rummaging of his drawers, that
constitutes the essence of the offense; but it is the invasion of his indefeasible
right of personal security, personal liberty, and private property ....
Id.
31. 232 U.S. at 394. The Court stated, "To sanction [government infringement of
citizens' rights] would be to affirm by judicial decision a manifest neglect, if not an open
defiance, of the prohibitions of the Constitution, intended for the protection of the people
against such unauthorized action." Id.
32. 251 U.S. 385 (1920).
33. Id. at 390-91.
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exclusionary rule is "not merely [that] evidence [illegally] acquired shall
not be used before the Court but that it shall not be used at all."34 The
Court reafr-med Silverthorne nine years later in Nardone v. United
States,3 5 and referring to excludable evidence, penned the popular
phrase "fruit of the poisonous tree."3"
In 1961 the Court in Mapp v.Ohio37 extended the exclusionary rule
to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. 8 Mapp suggested
a very broad application of the exclusionary rule to Fourth Amendment
violations.39 The Court in Mapp, citing both Boyd and Weeks, also
highlighted the importance of the exclusionary rule as the only effective
deterrent against constitutional violations by the government.4' The
Court noted that at the time of its decision, half of the states formerly
opposed to the exclusionary rule had since adopted it because they found
alternative deterrents to have been "worthless" and "futile" and to have
"completely failed" in practice.41 Thus, according to the Court in Mapp,
the exclusionary rule was the only effective
restraint against constitu42
tional violations by the government.
Almost ten years later, in Whiteley v. Warden,43 the Court cited Mapp
and suggested a reflexive application 4 of the exclusionary rule to
Fourth Amendment violations. 45 The broad language in Mapp and its
application in Whiteley gave huge power, initially, to the exclusionary rule.

34. Id. at 392.
35. 308 U.S. 338 (1939).
36. Id. at 341. The Court stated that "the trial judge must give opportunity... to the
accused to prove that a substantial portion of the case against him was a fruit of the
poisonous tree." Id.
37. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
38. Id. at 654-55. The Court in Mapp overruled a line of cases starting with Wolf v.
Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949), which had refused to extend the exclusionary rule to the
states. Mapp, 367 U.S. at 650, 654-55.
39. See 367 U.S. at 655. The Court stated, "[A]ll evidence obtained by searches and
seizures in violation of the Constitution is ... inadmissible in a state court." Id.
40. Id. at 656.
41. Id. at 651-52.
42. Id. at 656.
43. 401 U.S. 560 (1971).
44. This language of "reflexive application" was used in Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1
(1995), to describe how the Court in Whiteley "treated identification of a Fourth
Amendment violation as synonymous with application of the exclusionary rule to evidence
secured incident to that violation." Id. at 13. Out of the entire Court's opinion in Whiteley,
Justice Harlan devoted only one sentence to the exclusionary rule's application. 401 U.S.
at 569. After concluding there was a Fourth Amendment violation by the government, he
simply set forth that the evidence should be excluded and did not discuss the issue further,
implying a reflexive, or automatic, application of the rule. Id.
45. 401 U.S. at 569.
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Restricting the Application of the Exclusionary Rule

Not long after Mapp, the Supreme Court began restricting the
application of the exclusionary rule. In United States v. Calandra,s
the Court held that the rule is a remedy, not a personal right, and
47
should only be applied as a deterrent against police misconduct.
Therefore, according to the Court, evidence should not be excluded where
there is little deterrent effect.4 In United States v. Leon49 and Arizona v. Evans,5 ° the Supreme Court rejected the reflexive application of
the exclusionary rule suggested by Mapp and Whiteley.51 In both cases,
the Court held that whether the exclusionary rule applies is a different
issue from whether the police violated a person's Fourth Amendment
rights. 2 Most recently, in Pennsylvania Board of Probation & Parole
v. Scott, 3 the Court held that the exclusionary rule should only be used
' 4
if its benefit of deterrence outweighs its "'substantial social costs.'
Such costs include preventing effective truth-seeking by courts and
allowing the guilty to go free.55 Thus, the recent trend in the Court's
application of the exclusionary rule shows a non-reflexive application of
the rule to constitutional violations and a balancing of the rule's social
costs with its benefits as a deterrent.
E.

Exceptions to the Exclusionary Rule
The exclusionary rule's application has been restricted through a
number of exceptions. Two principle exceptions are (1) the attenuation
56
exception and (2) the inevitable discovery exception.

46. 414 U.S. 338 (1974).
47. Id. at 347-48.
48. Id. at 348.
49. 468 U.S. 897 (1984).
50. 514 U.S. 1 (1995).
.51. Leon, 468 U.S. at 905-06; Evans, 514 U.S. at 14.
52. Leon, 468 U.S. at 905-06; Evans, 514 U.S. at 13-14; see also Illinois v. Krull, 480
U.S. 340 (1987); Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 468 U.S. 981 (1984); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S.
465 (1976).
53. 524 U.S. 357 (1998).
54. Id. at 363 (quoting Leon, 468 U.S. at 907).
55. Leon, 468 U.S. at 907; Stone, 428 U.S. at 490.
56. There are several exceptions to the exclusionary rule, but the two most relevant in
Hudson v. Michigan, 126 S.Ct. 2159 (2006), are the attenuation and inevitable discovery
exceptions. One other exception that closely resembles the inevitable discovery exception
is the independent source exception. To meet this exception, the government must prove
that the evidence was discovered as a result of a legal source independent of the tainted
source. See Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796, 815-16 (1984). The Supreme Court
recognized this doctrine as far back as Silverthorne, 251 U.S. at 392, and Nardone, 308
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1. The Attenuation Exception. Attenuation occurs when the
causal connection between the illegal government conduct and the
discovery of evidence is so remote as to "dissipate the taint" from the
illegal conduct.57 This concept was briefly noted in Nardone.5 s Almost
twenty-five years later, the Court in Wong Sun v. United States59 used
the attenuation analysis to include a defendant's statement that was
sufficiently attenuated from the government's illegal conduct. Wong Sun
had been arrested illegally, but he voluntarily returned to the police
days after being released and gave a statement.'0 The Court held that
the statement was admissible because the connection between the
voluntary statement and the illegal arrest "'had become so attenuated
as to dissipate the taint.' 61
The Supreme Court has also held that interests relating to the
exclusionary rule, as well as those protected by the Fourth Amendment,
are factors in the attenuation analysis.62 In United States v. Ceccolini,63 a police officer was on break inside a store and engaged in casual
conversation with an employee when he discovered an envelope full of
money and gambling slips. The officer asked the employee to whom the
envelope belonged, and the employee told the officer that Ceccolini had
left it with her and given her instructions to give it to someone. Five
months later, Ceccolini denied any gambling involvement in front of a
grand jury. The issue on appeal was whether the employee's testimony
could be used as evidence of perjury against Ceccolini. The district court
ruled, and the court of appeals affirmed, that the employee's testimony

U.S. at 341. For example, in Segura v. United States, the Supreme Court did not exclude
evidence where police illegally entered an apartment and waited nineteen hours to secure
a warrant before conducting a legal search. 468 U.S. at 799. The Court reasoned that
exclusion was only proper for evidence gained as a result of the particular violation. See
id. Since the violation in Segura was the illegal entry, the evidence obtained from the
independent, legal search could not be excluded. Id. at 814; see also Murray v. United
States, 487 U.S. 533 (1988) (holding evidence was not excludable where officers illegally
entered a warehouse and saw the evidence, but then applied for and waited for a warrant
based on information wholly unrelated to the illegal entry).
57. Nardone, 308 U.S. at 341.
58. Id. The Court stated, "As a matter of good sense, [a causal connection] may have
become so attenuated as to dissipate the taint." Id.
59. 371 U.S. 471 (1963).
60. Id. at 475-76.
61. Id. at 491 (quoting Nardone, 308 U.S. at 341).
62. United States v. Ceccolini, 435 U.S. 268, 278-79 (1978).
63. 435 U.S. 268 (1978).
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should be excluded because, regardless of the time between both
statements, the causal connection was direct and uninterrupted.'
The Supreme Court reversed, reasoning that attenuation analysis is
not a simple, logical, or scientific analysis.6 5 Rather, the Court held,
the attenuation analysis necessarily consists of other elements. 6 These
other elements include the interests protected by the exclusionary rule,
such as deterrence of police misconduct, and the constitutional principles
protected by the exclusionary rule, such as citizens' rights.6 7 According
to the Court, whether or not those interests would be furthered by
exclusion is an element of the attenuation analysis.6 8 Therefore,
because exclusion would have no deterrent effect upon a police officer
like the one in Ceccolini, who was apparently acting honestly, the Court
held that exclusion was inappropriate.6 9
In United States v. Leon, 0 the Court noted that the attenuation
exception was a method of balancing the deterrent effect of the
exclusionary rule with its social costs. 71 In short, it attempts to
establish the point at which the consequences of police misconduct are
so attenuated that the deterrent effect of the exclusionary rule can no
longer justify the cost of excluding the evidence, as in Ceccolini.2
2. The Inevitable Discovery Exception. The inevitable discovery
exception to the exclusionary rule applies when discovery of evidence
would have occurred inevitably, despite the illegal act.7" The rule was
adopted by the Supreme Court in the 1984 case Nix v. Williams.7 4 In
Nix a murder suspect was denied his Sixth Amendment right to counsel
when an officer elicited from him the location of the body without an
attorney present. At the time of the interrogation, a large search party
had stopped for the day, two and one-half miles from where the body

64. Id. at 272-73.
65. Id. at 274.
66. Id.
67. See id.
68. Id. at 279.
69. Id. at 279-80; see also Leon, 468 U.S. at 911 (noting that the flagrancy of police
misconduct is a factor in the attenuation analysis).
70. 468 U.S. 897 (1984).
71. Id. at 911 (citing Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 217-18 (1979)).
72. Id. (citing Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 609 (1975) (Powell, J., concurring in
part)).
73. Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 440-41 (1984). Unlike the independent source
exception, supra note 56, there is no actual legal discovery for an inevitable discovery
exception. Rather, the government must show that the same evidence "inevitably would
have been discovered by lawful means." See Nix, 467 U.S. at 444.
74. 467 U.S. 431, 440-41 (1984).
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was located. 7' The Court held that evidence resulting from the
interrogation was not excludable because the search party would
inevitably have found the body upon resuming their search, despite the
illegally elicited statement from the suspect.76 The inevitable discovery
exception has since been applied by lower courts to Fourth Amendment
violations."
F

The Exclusionary Rule and Knock-and-Announce Violations
Since Weeks v. United States,78 the Supreme Court has applied the
exclusionary rule in a number of cases involving, mainly, warrantless
searches; 79 invalid warrants;80 warrantless arrests and searches;"
invalid searches incident to arrest;8 2 and warrantless entry into homes
without exigent circumstances.83 However, until Hudson v. Michigan, 4 the Court had not directly addressed the rule's application to
knock-and-announce violations, and lower courts were thus left to make
their own unguided and varied decisions.
For example, in People v. Stevens, 5 the Michigan Supreme Court
used the inevitable discovery exception in holding that the exclusionary
rule did not apply to a knock-and-announce violation.8" There, officers
executing a search warrant knocked, announced, and waited eleven
seconds before forcing entry into the defendant's home. 7 Though the
entry was deemed to violate the knock-and-announce requirement, the
court held that the evidence would have been discovered if the officers

75. Id. at 435-36.
76. Id. at 449-50.
77. See, e.g., People v. Stevens, 597 N.W.2d 53 (Mich. 1999).
78. 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
79. See, e.g., Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499 (1978); Fahy v. Connecticut, 375 U.S. 85
(1963); Taylor v. United States, 286 U.S. 1 (1932); Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20
(1925).
80. See, e.g., Byars v. United States, 273 U.S. 28 (1927); Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S.
476 (1965).
81. See, e.g., Kirk v. Louisiana, 536 U.S. 635 (2002) (per curiam); Connally v. Georgia,
429 U.S. 245 (1977) (per curiam); McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451 (148).
82. See, e.g., Vale v. Louisiana, 399 U.S. 30 (1970); Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752
(1969).
83. See, e.g., Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91 (1990); Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740
(1984).
84. 126 S. Ct. 2159 (2006).
85. 597 N.W.2d 53.
86. Id. at 55.

87. Id. at 56.
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had entered legally, and therefore, the inevitable discovery exception was
met. 8
However, in United States v. Dice,8 9 the Sixth Circuit Court of
Appeals held that the exclusionary rule did apply to a knock-andannounce violation.9" In Dice police waited only a few seconds after
knocking and announcing their presence before entering a home where
they discovered over one thousand marijuana plants." The court noted
that the inevitable discovery exception requires a second independent,
legal investigation that inevitably would have uncovered the evidence.9 2
The court held that a knock-and-announce violation is a part of one
investigation and that same investigation cannot be used as an
inevitable discovery in order to invoke an exception to the exclusionary
93
rule.
Opposing decisions such as Stevens and Dice demonstrate the split of
authority concerning the application of the exclusionary rule to knockand-announce violations. Many commentators have claimed that Stevens
was based on a misunderstanding of the inevitable discovery exception
as defined in Nix.94 Others assert that Stevens was correctly decided
and that the exclusionary rule is an inappropriate remedy for knock-andannounce violations.9" The Supreme Court has now sided with Stevens
in its decision in Hudson v. Michigan.9 6

III.

COURT'S RATIONALE
In Hudson v. Michigan, the Supreme Court considered for the first
time whether the exclusionary rule should be applied to knock-andannounce violations.98 In making its decision, the Court contemplated
its rulings on the use of the exclusionary rule in other contexts, 99 as
97

88.
States
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.

Id. at 62; see also United States v. Jones, 214 F.3d 836 (7th Cir. 2000); United
v. Jones, 149 F.3d 715 (7th Cir. 1998).
200 F.3d 978 (2000).
Id. at 980.
Id. at 980-81.
Id. at 985-87.
Id.; see also State v. Lee, 821 A.2d 922 (Md. 2003).

94. See, e.g., Robin L. Gentry, Note, Why Knock? The Door Will Inevitably Open: An
Analysis of People v. Stevens and the Michigan Supreme Court's Departure from Fourth
Amendment Protection, 46 WAYNE L. REv. 1659, 1678-84 (2000).
95. See, e.g., Randall S. Bethune, Note, The Exclusionary Rule and the Knock-andAnnounce Violation: Unreasonable Remedy for Otherwise Reasonable Search Warrant
Execution, 22 WHITTER L. REV. 879, 908 (2001).
96.
97.
98.
99.

126 S. Ct. at 2162, 2170.
126 S. Ct. 2159 (2006).
See id. at 2162.
See id. at 2168-70.
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well as the rule's deterrence benefits, specifically for knock-andannounce violations. 10 0
A. The Majority Noted the Recent Restriction of the Exclusionary
Rule's Application
Justice Scalia, writing for the majority in parts I through III of the
opinion, reasoned that the exclusionary rule was never meant to be
reflexively applied to knock-and-announce violations.' 1 He noted only
the history of the exclusionary rule's application, starting with Weeks v.
United States,102 Mapp v. Ohio,10 3 and Whiteley v. Warden,"°4 and
the suggested broad application of the rule.' 5 However, Justice Scalia
stressed the Court's more recent restriction of the rule's application in
cases such as United States v. Calandra,"6 United States v. Leon, °7
Arizona v. Evans,1 and Pennsylvania Board of Probation& Parole v.
Scott," s and noted that the Court had "long since rejected" such a
broad approach." 0 Thus, according to the majority, the Court's
position at the time of Hudson was that exclusion of evidence does not
occur just because a constitutional violation was a but-for cause of
obtaining evidence."'
B.

The Court's Implication of the Inevitable Discovery Exception
The Court took this but-for analysis even further. It attempted to
separate an illegal manner of entry from the related search as a
whole." 2 The Court claimed that a knock-and-announce violation was
an illegal manner of entry separate from the search, and therefore, not
a but-for cause of obtaining the evidence."' The Court reasoned, like
the Michigan Supreme Court in People v. Stevens," 4 that even if the
police had not entered illegally, they still would have executed the

100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.

See id. at 2165-68.
See id. at 2163-64.
232 U.S. 383 (1914).
367 U.S. 643 (1961).
401 U.S. 560 (1970).
Id.
414 U.S. 338 (1974).
468 U.S. 897 (1964).
514 U.S. 1 (1995).
524 U.S. 357 (1998).
Hudson, 126 S. Ct. at 2163-64.
Id. at 2164; see Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 487-88 (1963).
See Hudson, 126 S. Ct. at 2164.
Id.
597 N.W.2d 53, 62 (Mich. 1999).
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warrant and discovered the evidence inside the house.115 Thus, the
Court implied that the knock-and-announce violation satisfied the
inevitable discovery exception." 6 Justice Scalia admitted, however,
that even if such an illegal manner of entry is considered a but-for cause
of obtaining evidence, precedent shows that the evidence is not
necessarily excluded. 7
C. The Supreme Court Held that Attenuation Exists
The Court, citing United States v. Ceccolini,"8 noted that even where
there is a direct causal connection between the illegal act and the
discovery of evidence, attenuation can occur where the interests
protected by the rule violated are not served by exclusion. 9 The
Court cited the three main interests commonly associated with the
knock-and-announce requirement: (1) the protection of human life and
limb, 2 ° (2) the protection of property, 2 ' and (3) the protection of
residents' privacy and dignity that could be destroyed upon a sudden
entrance, 22 and noted that keeping evidence from the government is
not one of those interests. 2 ' Therefore, the Court held that since the
interests violated in Hudson do not include the seizure of evidence, the
exclusionary rule is inapplicable.' 2 4 This idea of attenuation was the
central part of the Court's holding. Essentially, the Court held that
knock-and-announce violations should not result in exclusion of evidence
violated by the government are those protected by
unless the interests
125
the rule itself.

115. Hudson, 126 S. Ct. at 2164.
116. Id.
117. Id. (citing Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796, 815 (1984)).
118. 435 U.S. 268 (1978).
119. Hudson, 126 S. Ct. at 2164 (citing Ceccolini, 435 U.S. at 279).
120. Id. at 2165. The Court noted that "an unannounced entry may provoke violence
in supposed self-defense by the surprised resident." Id.
121. Id. The Court observed that "[tihe knock-and-announce rule gives individuals 'the
opportunity to comply with the law and to avoid the destruction of property occasioned by
a forcible entry.'" Id. (quoting Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385, 393 n.5 (1997)).
122. Id. The Court noted that the knock-and-announce requirement "gives residents
the 'opportunity to prepare themselves for' the entry of the police," and to, for example,
"'pull on clothes or get out of bed.'" Id. (quoting Richards, 520 U.S. at 393 n.5).
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. See id.
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D. Substantial Social Costs
The Court devoted much of its opinion to balancing the concept of
"substantial social costs" with the "deterrence benefits" of the exclusionary rule. 126 The majority observed that the highest and most obvious
cost of the exclusionary rule is the cost of allowing the guilty to go
free. 127 Another cost, the Court noted, would be the flood of litigation
that would result from defendants seeking a "get-out-of-jail-free
card." 2 '
Knock-and-announce litigation is more complicated than
disputes over, for example, the warrant requirement or the Miranda
requirement.'29 With knock-and-announce disputes, courts must deal
with determining, for example, what is a reasonable wait time. °
These determinations, the Court explained, are more difficult to make
than determining simply whether there was a warrant or whether a
Miranda warning was given, and these determinations would thus be
3
more costly to courts.1 1
Another cost of the exclusionary rule, noted the Court, is that if the
consequences of a violation of the knock-and-announce rule are so great
that evidence would be excluded, and a reasonable wait time is
uncertain, then officers would be inclined to wait longer than is required
by law.3 2 According to the Court, this inclination to wait could result
in "preventable violence" to officers in some cases and destroyed evidence
33
in many others.
E.

Deterrence Benefits
The Court recognized that deterrence of police misconduct is a
"necessary condition" for excluding evidence, but it is not alone a
sufficient condition.3 4 The Court observed that the value of deterrence
depends upon the government's incentive towards violation, and in
support of this, the Court again made an analogy to the violation of the
warrant requirement.'3 5 The Court further observed that the incen-
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Id. at 2165-66.
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134. Id.; United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. at 350 (noting that "it does not follow that
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tive there-to obtain evidence otherwise unobtainable-is different from
a violation of the knock-and-announce requirement, which "can
realistically be expected to achieve absolutely nothing" except the
prevention of destruction of evidence and the avoidance of resistance by
occupants. 3 6
The Court suggested two alternative methods of deterrence. The first8
was civil suit.'37 In 1976 Congress passed 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b),1
which authorized attorney fees for civil-rights plaintiffs at the court's
discretion. 1 9 The Court noted that the reason for 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b)
was that some civil-rights violations would result in damages too small
to justify the expense of bringing suit." ° The Court also noted that
the "heydays" of exclusionary rule jurisprudence took place before this
statute was enacted.' 4 ' Therefore, the Court claimed that after Mapp
but before this statute, attorneys were very reluctant to take on civil
rights claims against the police. 142 However, according to the Court,
"'Citizens and lawyers [today] are much more willing to seek relief in the
courts for police misconduct." ' 1 The Court stated that the number of
public interest attorneys and law firms has greatly expanded,'" thus
allowing for better access to civil remedies for knock-and-announce
violations.'45
The Court acknowledged, however, that few decisions announced large
awards for knock-and-announce violations." The Court asserted that
this statistic is unhelpful because it first assumes that only large
damages would deter police misconduct, and further, the statistic does
not include settlements or violations producing "anything more than
nominal injury."1 47 Then with little further explanation, the Court
concluded, "As far as we know, civil liability is an effective deterrent
here, as we have assumed it is in other contexts."'"8
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The second alternative deterrent was more of a development than an
actual method of deterrence. 4 9 The Court noted that police forces
have seen an increase in professionalism and a new focus on internal
police discipline. 150 According to the Court, "There have been 'wideranging reforms in the education, training, and supervision of police officers.'"'15 The Court claimed to "have increasing evidence that police
forces across the United States take the constitutional rights of citizens
seriously."'5 2 Thus, according to the Court, one deterrent against
police misconduct is the police themselves.
F

Concurrence

Justice Kennedy concurred in parts I through III of the opinion and
concurred in the judgment.5 3 His concurrence served, for the most
part, as emotional reinforcement to Scalia's opinion. 5 4 At the very
beginning, Justice Kennedy highlighted two points: First, "The Court's
decision should not be interpreted as suggesting that violations of the
[knock-and-announce] requirement are trivial or beyond the law's
concern," and second, "the continued operation of the exclusionary rule,
as settled and defined by [the Court's] precedents, is not in doubt."'55
In the next paragraph, Justice Kennedy continued: "It bears repeating
that it is a serious matter if law enforcement officers violate the sanctity
of the home by ignoring the requisites of lawful entry."'5 6 His language implies that Justice Kennedy anticipated an outcry against the
majority's decision.'5 7
He went on to support Justice Scalia's proposed alternative deterrents
to knock-and-announce violations while, again, anticipating disagreement. 15
In support of the claim that law enforcement interdisciplin-
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151.

See id. at 2168.
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ary procedures and training have improved, Justice Kennedy added that
"[i]f those measures prove ineffective, they can be fortified with more
detailed regulations or legislation. " 1 59 Also, for civil suits against
knock-and-announce violations, he noted that even "exceptional cases in
which unannounced entries cause severe fright and humiliation" are
subject to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.1'
Justice Kennedy did note, however, that the majority decision does not
address a pattern of knock-and-announce violations. 6 ' According to
Justice Kennedy, if such a "widespread pattern" of violations were
shown, and especially if the violations were against those of limited
means or voice to effectively protest a violation, "there would be reason
for grave concern." 62 However, he continued, if this were the case,
then the possibility of extending the exclusionary rule to all knock-andannounce violations would still come into conflict with the Court's
requirement of a "'sufficient causal relationship'"'" between the
violation and discovery of evidence, which limits suppression of
evidence."M
G.

Dissent

According to the dissent, written by Justice Breyer and joined by
Justices Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg, the Court's opinion "destroys the
strongest legal incentive to comply with the Constitution's knock-andannounce requirement. And [it] does so without significant support in
precedent."16 5
1. The Majority Misunderstood the Inevitable Discovery
Exception. The majority's interpretation that absent the illegal entry,
the police would have executed the warrant and discovered the evidence
anyway is, according to the dissent, a misunderstanding of the inevitable
discovery exception.'" The question, according to the dissent, is not
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166. Id. at 2178-79. Justice Breyer alleged that trying to separate the manner of entry
from the related search goes too far. The Court noted that Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S.
927 (1995), was the case that first set out that the knock-and-announce requirement was
to be a factor in the reasonableness inquiry of a search and not an "independently unlawful
event." Hudson, 126 S. Ct. at 2177 (citing Wilson, 514 U.S. at 936). According to Justice
Breyer, the two appear inseparable. See id.
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what police might have done if they behaved lawfully, but rather, what
they actually did do. 1 7 If what they did was illegal, then the question
is whether there was a search independent of the illegal action that
would have inevitably discovered the evidence." According to Justice
Breyer, there was no such independent search here, and therefore, no
inevitable discovery exception.'6 9
2. There Was an Interest Violated. The dissent claimed that the
majority's interest-based definition of attenuation, as cited from United
States v. Ceccolini, v° gave "new meaning" to the word as opposed to
how it had been commonly understood in prior case law. 17 ' According
to Justice Breyer, there were three serious problems with this "new
meaning."
First, Justice Breyer claimed that the interests protected by the knockand-announce rule as laid out by the majority are incomplete. 72 He
agreed that protection of human life, property, and those elements of
privacy and dignity destroyable upon sudden entry are protected
interests. 7
However, Justice Breyer noted that the majority overlooked the major interest of protecting "the occupants' privacy by
assuring them that government agents will not enter their home without
complying" with legal procedures.1 74 This was the principle articulated
in Boyd v. United States7 over one hundred years ago; according to
Breyer, that principle deserved more than to be reduced to an inconsequential interest, as he felt the majority had done in the case. 6
Second, Justice Breyer posited that whether the interests of the rule
are implicated, in a sense, does not matter. 7 7 Justice Breyer noted
that according to Wilson, failure to comply with the knock-and-announce
rule deems a search unreasonable. 7
Unreasonable searches, he

167. 126 S. Ct. at 2179.
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170. 435 U.S. 268 (1978).
171. Hudson, 126 S. Ct. at 2180 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Attenuation, claimed the
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continued, are unlawful searches according to the Constitution.'79
Further, since Weeks v. United States 180 and Mapp v. Ohio,""' evidence seized from unlawful searches has been barred.'8 2 Thus,
according to Justice Breyer, because the search is illegal, the interests
of the8 3 rule need not be considered for the purposes of the exclusionary

rule.1

Third, Justice Breyer claimed that the majority's interest-based
attenuation approach departs from prior law.'8 4 According to Justice
Breyer, the majority did not point to any relevant cases that support
such a detailed requirement of causal relation for exclusion. 8 5 He
argued that instead, a court will usually only look to see if the unconstitutional search produced the evidence.8 6 A more detailed causal
connection requirement would, according to the dissent, "complicate
Fourth Amendment suppression law, threatening its workability."'87
3. The Dissent Attacked the Majority's Alternative Deterrents. Justice Breyer also attacked the majority's proposed alternative
deterrents to knock-and-announce violations. 1" He noted that alternative remedies were addressed in Mapp.5 9 The Court there, based on
the experiences of over half of the states, found all other remedies to
have completely failed. 190 "What reason is there to believe," Breyer
asked, "that those remedies ...

found inadequate in Mapp, can

adequately deter unconstitutional police behavior here?"19'
Referring to the alternative remedy of civil suit, Justice Breyer pointed
out, like the majority, that few knock-and-announce violations have
resulted in large civil remedies. 92 He added, however, that in contrast
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182. Hudson, 126 S. Ct. at 2173 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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191. Hudson, 126 S. Ct. at 2174 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Justice Breyer suggested that
"[t]o argue, as the majority does, that new remedies... make suppression unnecessary is
to argue that Wolf, not Mapp, is now the law." Id. at 2175.
192. Id. at 2174. According to the dissent, "[T]he majority... has failed to cite a single
reported case in which a plaintiff has collected more than nominal damages solely as a
result of a knock-and-announce violation." Id.
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to the number of civil remedies, there are a significant number of cases
reporting knock-and-announce violations-indicating that the "'widespread pattern"' that Justice Kennedy feared might develop does, in fact,
already exist. 93 Furthermore, the majority's accounting for few civil
suits because violations produce nothing "'more than nominal injury,"'
actually supports the argument that civil suits are an insufficient
deterrent to police misconduct, according to Justice Breyer.'9 4 He
added further that the idea that the statistic is low because suits may
"'have been settled' is, perhaps, to search in desperation for an
argument."'9 5
Finally, Breyer claimed that the majority simply
"'assumed' that, '[als far as [it] know[s], civil liability is an effective
deterrent.'"'96 This contention, according to the dissent, is a "supportfree assumption" that Mapp and recent case history clearly does not
embody. 9 v Thus, Justice Breyer concluded, the need for deterrence by
exclusion of evidence is great.' 98
In reference to the majority's reliance on the concept of "substantial
social costs," Justice Breyer stated simply, that these costs are the same
costs typically associated with any use of the exclusionary rule. 99
Therefore, the substantial social costs argument "is an argument against
the Fourth Amendment's exclusionary principle itself. And it0 0 is an
2
argument that this Court, until now, has consistently rejected."
IV.

IMPLICATIONS

The decision in Hudson v. Michigan'0 results in two main implications. First, more people will likely be sent to prison because evidence
will not be excluded in court. However, this comes at the cost of the
peoples' constitutional right against illegal entry by police. Police now
know that they can ignore the knock-and-announce rule completely and
still keep the discovered evidence. The only possible consequence now
is a civil suit, a remedy found previously to have completely failed,2 2
yet "assumed" to exist by the majority in Hudson.' ° ' If this remedy
once again proves deficient, will the police adopt a policy of not
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knocking? This would be Justice Kennedy's "reason for grave concern, "2°4 and perhaps a step towards changing his fifth vote in a later
case. More importantly, a policy against knocking would increase the
instances of violence associated with surprise, no-knock entries.
The Court's holding also suggests that under a conservative court,
more limitations of the exclusionary rule are likely to happen. Justice
Scalia was joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas and
Alito, while Justice Breyer was joined in the dissent by Justices Stevens,
Souter, and Ginsburg. Justice Kennedy was in the middle with the
concurrence. The two most recently added Justices, Chief Justice
Roberts and Justice Alito, sided with the conservative, pro-government
argument and furthered their reputation as conservative judges. Justice
Kennedy furthered his reputation as Justice O'Connor's replacement in
the middle, and sided reservedly with the conservatives. As the fifth
vote, however, Justice Kennedy's concurrence shows the closeness of this
decision and foreshadows an uncertain future of Supreme Court
jurisprudence for the exclusionary rule. The decision in Hudson v.
Michigan implies that the Court is in the beginnings of yet another
polarized era of jurisprudence, which forces the ninth judge to make the
difference.
DAVID CARN
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